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"The best security against a total want of circulating medium, in the time of our utmost need, will be found in the necessity, which persons in the middling classes of life already feel, of providing before hand for such an occasion."—LORD GRENVILLE'S Speech, in the House of Lords, 13th Dec. 1803.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

JUBILEE DOLLARS.—The observations, in my last Number, upon the manifest advantages of *hoarding*, have called forth the wrath of one or two of the venal tribe of writers, who ascribe those observations to a wish on my part "to *destroy public credit*, and to cause *confusion and uproar*." I wonder that these venal personages had not added, that my ultimate design was to take advantage of the said confusion and uproar, in order to get out of prison, and to free myself of the fines and recognizances, to which I am subjected. There wanted only this to make the charge complete.—Poor fools! How they *fret* themselves! How they discover their alarm! How they betray their dread of me, even in this situation! The world will easily judge how bad their cause must be, when every line of mine appals them thus. Why do they not *laugh* at me? I am a fool, they say; a writer whom all the nation despises; a person whose word passes for nothing. Why, then, do they not *laugh*, laugh heartily at me? And, on the other hand, if they have been expressing all this contempt in jest; if they do really think me able to do injury to *public credit*, why do they not endeavour to dissuade me from my purpose by good words? Their *railing* at me will not make any man disbelieve my facts, or be unconvinced by my arguments. Their curses, which are always sweet to my ears, will not *lower the price of the Dollar*; no, nor will they prevent it from *rising*. It will continue to rise, in spite of all they can say or do. They have succeeded in their endeavours to keep down the Jacobins and Levellers; their lies and their cunning have served their purpose thus far; and all that they have now to do is to lie down the Dollar. Oh! this Dollar! this Dollar is the thing! This Dollar, which, by the order of the Privy Council, passes for 6d. more than is written upon it. It is called "BANK TOKEN for five shillings." And that same Bank now tells the same

people, amongst whom it was issued at 5s., that it is *worth more* than the said five shillings.—But, to return to the subject of *hoarding*, I would ask these venal men *why* they look upon me as desiring to *destroy public credit* and to cause *confusion and uproar*; why they think that my wish to produce this effect is indicated in my observations on the *advantages of hoarding*.—Are we to look upon *public credit* as dependant upon people's abstaining from hoarding? Will their hoarding up the real money *destroy public credit*? If it will, public credit is, I am satisfied, in a very bad way.—But as to "*confusion and uproar*," can the hoarding of money produce any such effects? On the contrary, it appears to me, that the hoarding of money is a very *quiet* operation, and tends as little to produce quarrels and strife as any thing can. When a man has got his money in a hoard, he is very apt to be as still as a mouse. He will take good care not to *boast* of it; he will have no desire to challenge any one to a comparison of hoards; and, in short, it seems to me, that nothing is more likely to produce peace and quietness than hoarding.—In my last number, I proved the great advantage of hoarding, to *individuals*; and I am of opinion, that it will not be less so in a *national* point of view. This is no new opinion of mine. I expressed in the 4th Volume of the Register, pages 795 and 796, upon the memorable occasion, when Mr. JERKYLL, having heard that hoarding was going on, *complained* of it, in the House of Commons, described it as a *great evil*, and, in the true spirit of a *lawyer*, proposed to *put a stop* to it, and, of course, to *punish* the parties guilty of it. Mr. ADDINGTON, the "great man" of that day, agreed with his brother lawyer as to the *baseness* of the practice of hoarding, and assured him, that the matter had been *under the consideration of the Privy Council*.—Upon this LORD GRENVILLE made some very good observations, in the speech, part of which I have taken for my motto, and a fuller extract from which I here in-

sert, in order to shew, that the opinion of the usefulness of hoarding is not confined to the Jacobins and Levellers.—“We are told from authority, that there appears in the country an eagerness to collect, or, as it is insidiously called, to hoard cash. In times of scarcity the ignorant are taught to clamour against the farmer and the cornfactor, who, by collecting and preserving grain, afford to a country its only security against famine. By the salutary provision of nature, the measures which individuals take in such cases for their own security and benefit constitute in their aggregate the security and advantage of the community itself. In the same manner (it might appear paradoxical, but if a paradox, it was one which he held in common with all enlightened writers on this subject) the best security against a total want of circulating medium in the time of our utmost need, would be found in the necessity, which persons in the middling classes of life already feel, of providing beforehand for such an occasion. How, indeed, could it be expected, that when a man of that description joins the volunteer ranks, and serves his country in the field, he should leave his family to rely entirely, and for their daily bread, on the paper of a private banker, whose counting-house may be at that very moment occupied by the enemy.—The steps taken by such individuals to make provision for this case, must then of necessity produce at this time an increased demand for specie; that demand will in this, as in every other article, produce an increased value; and, unless the nature of things be inverted, the increased value must, in its turn, produce an increased supply. He was therefore beyond measure astonished to hear that in some other place, this conduct in persons of such a description had been spoken of as a fit subject of reproach and censure; and that this opinion had proceeded from a quarter which ought to be of the highest authority in matters of this nature. Such language could have no other tendency in this case (as in that to which he had already likened it) than to raise popular odium, and to excite popular tumult, against men who used their own discretion in disposing of their own property. If it were fit to censure such a disposition, it must be essential to endeavour to prevent it. There were two precedents in

history which might be resorted to for this purpose: two cases where, in support of an excessive issue of paper, government had regulated by law the quantity of specie which each individual should be suffered to retain. Those were the Mississippi scheme, and the scheme of the assignats. In both instances the measure had immediately annihilated the paper it was intended to support. He had no fear that the same principle, by whatever authority it had been countenanced, would be acted upon to the same extent in this country; but he must take the liberty to say, that in so far as it was followed up, either in speech or action, exactly in that proportion the public credit was affected and injured by it. The danger of such a shock to private paper, as he had stated, in the case of invasion, was not to be guarded against by such language, which had no other tendency than to increase that danger.—Lord Grenville said this on the 13th of December, 1803. I had said nearly the same thing ten days before. But, at any rate, this was said *by him*; and here is not only a *justification* of the practice of hoarding, but an eulogium on it.—Upon this same occasion LORD LIVERPOOL ascribed the evil of the Bank restriction to the *great prosperity* of the nation; to its wonderful *increase of trade*; its fine *spirit of adventure*. These, he said, gave rise to an *increase of paper*. Well: but, what is the cause of the rise of the Dollar now? Trade is not *now* so very flourishing. It has not increased of late. The spirit of adventure is not *now* so very fine.—The truth is, that those who attempt to ascribe the scarcity of coin to any other cause than the over issue of paper; and who attempt to ascribe that over issue to any thing other than the increase of the *national debt* and the *taxes*; all such persons must be involved in everlasting inconsistencies.—Before I quit the subject of hoarding, I must observe, that to hoard the money is the only means of *preventing it from going out of the country*. It will not circulate with the paper in its present state. The Privy Council and the Bank People saw that the Dollar, though already raised to 6d. above its old real value, would not condescend to pass any longer with the paper; and, therefore, they raised it to 5s. 6d. They did this *avowedly because the dollars were going out of circulation*. Very well, then, is it to be

supposed; will the Bank People, or even the Privy Council, suppose, that the *guinea* or *half-guinea*, or any other piece of gold or of silver will pass upon a par with that same paper? It is notorious that it does not; and it is evident that the thing cannot be.—Well, then, what is to become of the coin? What is to be done with it? Those who possess it will do one of two things with it: they will sell it for paper, and will, of course, obtain a greater sum in paper than they had in money; or, they will *hoard* it, having patience to look forward to the happy time when there will be nothing but money passing.—If John a' Nokes, for instance, sells a guinea, it may soon find its way into the hands of some one, who will *send it out of the country*; but, if he put it safely into his hoard, it is sure to remain in England, where it will be ready to come forth as soon as circumstances are such as to allow it to *pass for its value*, and which can happen only from one of two causes; the total annihilation of the paper-money, or two prices, a *cash price* and a *paper price*, openly made.—There is a confused notion afloat about preventing the further depreciation of the paper-money by *putting a stop to importations from the Continent of Europe*. To this, then, are we come at last! Where is now the boast about our *having the commerce of the world*?—But, to leave such reflections as these to the “PITT CLUB,” what good, as to the value of money, shall we derive from putting a stop to importations? Why, we are told, that, if we put a stop to importation, we shall have no money to pay to the Continent, and, of course, that our gold and silver *will not go away*.—This is one of these notions that are created by the reluctance which men have to see the truth; for, if it were not for such reluctance, every one would perceive, that, whether we have any thing from the Continent or not, the gold will not remain here, and will, of course, go there, *unless it be hoarded*. It does not go abroad because we owe money there. It goes because it cannot pass for its worth here; and, as to a *mode of conveyance*, that will never be difficult to find.—Hoarding, therefore, is, under such circumstances, the only means of reserving any coin at all in the country; and is, therefore, a practice very beneficial in a national point of view.—A correspondent has given me an instance, that occurred during the time of the assignats in France, which will serve to

illustrate what was said in my last about the advantage of hoarding to private persons.—“One,” says he, “who saw farther than his neighbours, got a large sum by *pawning* Louis d’ors, or French Guineas. He pawned 1,000, and borrowed 900 in *assignats*. With these he bought more Louis, at a time when they bore a premium of twenty per centum. He went on thus, ’till he had about 3,000 Louis in pawn, where he let them remain ’till the assignats lost cent. per cent., and then he *redeemed his Louis for half their value*. Was not this a curious speculation? But, I could fill your paper with others as curious.”—It was a very curious speculation; but, it was no more than what we shall see here, and what, indeed, we do see here now, in some degree. This shows the advantages of hoarding, whenever there is a paper-money that has begun to depreciate, where the depreciation has been produced by no sudden or alarming danger. No such cause has had any effect here now. There has been no *external* cause for the depreciation of the paper. All is internal; and, of course, the progress downwards must continue, until great confusion and mischief arise out of it, unless an effectual remedy be provided; and which remedy I shall leave to be found out by those, who reviled me as a traitor when I forwarned them of what all the world acknowledges is now come to pass. Let *them* find out the remedy; for, none shall they have from me.—The discussion that is to come on in the Honourable House, on the *thirtieth* instant (I wish it had been on the *first*), will be very curious indeed. It will demand all our attention. We shall then have all the opinions of *both the parties*. We shall hear what both have to say as to *remedies*. We shall have their opinions and predictions upon record. They have both been, they both are, supporters of the *funding system*. They are both alike pledged to the whole of the *Pitt system*. Let us, then, *hear them out*, and make a memorandum of what each of them says of the *future fate of the paper money*.—When that is done, I will give *my opinion*; I, whom the venal writers call the organ of the Jacobins, will tell the world what the Jacobins think of the matter: and, when that is done, we will all stand quietly by, and let *events* decide which of the three have most understanding. The other two parties have all the Doctors of all sorts with them. “Theirs the Gospel is, and

theirs the Laws?" They have all the grave and reverend Seniors. All the gowns and all the wigs. They have both Universities and all these *learned* bodies called Societies and Institutions. We have for us nothing at all but our own plain senses. And, we shall see, therefore, in the event as to the paper money, in what degree they are *our superior*.

AMERICAN STATES.—In another part of this Number, will be found a Letter from Mr. PINCKNEY to LORD WELLESLEY upon the subject of the Orders in Council.—It is, I think, impossible to deny, that, through the whole of this letter, Mr. PINCKNEY is unanswerable. The Berlin and Milan Decrees were *revoked*, and, according to *our promise*, we should have revoked the Orders in Council.—But, while this is decidedly my opinion, far be it from me to regret the *consequences* of our non-compliance. I mean the Acts which have been passed in America, to prevent any importation from England, and which I look upon as greatly favourable to the real interests of both countries. The former interruptions to intercourse were productive of much good; but this will, I hope, put an end to the unnatural *dependence* upon each other, which was so mischievous to England as well as to America.—The truth is, that it is, and long has been, the policy of those statesmen, who have now the predominance in America, to *wean* that country from this. The close connection between them they looked upon, and very justly, as tending to disturb the peace of America, because it kept alive a party hostile to the very nature of the Social Contract. To see their country liable, at any time, to be plunged into distress, unless it submitted to the will of another nation, was what they could not endure. Experience has convinced them that America can dispense with European manufactures; and, therefore it is, that they now assume a tone of more indifference than upon any former occasion.—Mr. PINCKNEY's Letter contains, in the very tone of it, a proof of the indifference of the American government as to any accommodation with ours. Those who have been anticipating, that the non-importation Act would not pass, do not appear to have perceived how much the circumstances of America are altered of late years. The former suspensions of trade with us, have produced effects never to be done away. They not only disposed, and

indeed, compelled the Americans to become manufacturers, but they also sent them out *hands* to assist them. Such has been the progress of manufactures there, that, as I am informed, a considerable quantity of cotton and woollen yarn has already been *exported* to Europe. Perhaps not less than 30 or 40 thousand Merino sheep have been introduced into the American States. Under these circumstances it would be madness for any one to suppose, that the American government did not hail with joy the fair pretence for passing a new Act of non-importation of English goods; and, especially when we reflect, that the persons now in power in America have always been opposed by the English merchants and their adherents in the United States.—Some of our newspapers give extracts from those of America, exclaiming bitterly against the *non-importation Act*, and also against the rejection of the *Bank Charter*. But, they take these extracts from prints wholly devoted to the English Merchants. If they were to quote from prints of the other side, they would convey to their readers quite a different view of the matter.—The fact is, that the *Bank of the United States* was little else than an *English concern*. It was little else than a *branch* of her ladyship in Threadneedle-street. She is, indeed, the only *original* Bank in the whole World. All the others, so matter where they be, are, more or less, her offspring, and are, more or less, dependent upon her. The Bank in America was a powerful instrument in the hands of the English merchants and their party. Therefore it is no wonder at all that their prints cry out against its being put a stop to: No wonder that, in the language of SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, they call this measure "*NATIONAL SUICIDE*." The straw-pen Baronet says, that "to cause any material *diminution* of that *mine of national prosperity* (Bank Notes), would be a species *of POLITICAL SUICIDE*, altogether *unpardonable*."—It is very curious to observe the similarity in the language. But, it seems, that the American Congress do not see any thing of the nature of a *mine* in the paper of their Bank, though observe, that paper was *payable in specie* at the will of the holder, and not, like ours, *payable in other bits of paper*. They saw no *mine* in it except a mine for subverting the morals and the liberties of the people. They appear not to have had the smallest notion of the efficacy of bank notes in caus-

ing an increase of corn and meat and wool. They appear not to have any notion of the force of bank notes in causing sunshine and showers and pulverizing frosts. Bedlam does not appear to have extended its philosophy so effectually to that country yet, notwithstanding the crowds of English merchants there settled.—The Americans are a cool, sensible, observing race of men. They have, too, had *ample experience* on the subject of paper-money; and it is no wonder, especially when they cast their eyes this way, that they resolve to tolerate nothing of the kind of a *national Bank*, out of which they must be sure, that a *national debt*, would soon grow, and, what a *national debt* produces they well know from our sad example. War and taxation are as necessary to a funding system as blood and bone are necessary to the human body; and, in time, war and taxation produce what we now see and feel.—Our prints would fain persuade us, that these Acts against *importation* and against the *bank*, in America, are the work of a mere faction; that they have been passed for selfish purposes; and that they are *disapproved of by the people*. But, *why* should we believe this? If, indeed, the Congress were not chosen by the people; if none but here and there a knot of bribed miscreants had the privilege of voting for Congressmen; if these latter were themselves a set of base jobbers; if the President, or his Secretary, in one way or another, could, through the means of these sham Representatives and Senators, buy and sell the people like cattle at a fair; if, in short, the Congress of America, were, like the *Corps Legislatif*, a set of purchased, perjured, knaves, intermixed with a due proportion of fools and cowards; if this were the case, then, indeed, there might be some reason for treating their decisions as the result of some villanous bargain, in which their own immediate profit was uppermost, or as the effect of an uniform desire to support a system, through the means of which the people were oppressed and robbed with impunity. But, being *really chosen by the people*, and chosen *annually* too, they must be supposed to speak the wish of the people, whether that wish be wise or foolish.—It seems to me, that this state of things between England and America is fortunate for both countries, but more particularly for the former, whose only chance of salvation lies in a speedily betaking herself to the cultivation of her own natural and

mighty *internal resources* and in casting off at once all dependence upon external commerce. If I am asked, how the *taxes* are to be raised without external commerce, and how, if the taxes fall off, the *interest of the national debt* is to be paid; I answer, that these are no affairs of mine; that my anxiety extends no further than the preservation of England and Scotland and Ireland, one independent country, inhabited by a free and happy people; but, that, I beg to observe, that, if the *taxes* and the *fundholders' interest* depend upon external commerce, there is a strong probability that they will both suffer a great diminution.

PORTUGUESE GRANT OF MONEY.—The House of Commons has had laid before it a Letter from the Viscount Talavera, dated in October last, upon the subject of yielding *relief* to those persons in Portugal, who have suffered from the operations of the war. Upon the report in this Letter, it would seem, that the grant of 100,000*l.* to these sufferers has been made, after a Message to that intent from his Royal Highness, the Prince Regent.—But, by a reference to the letter, the reader will perceive, that his Excellency the Lord Marshall does not suggest the necessity, nor, indeed, the propriety, of *parliamentary* relief, but of relief from the *charitable disposition* of the good people of this country, whose usual benevolence he takes this opportunity most aptly to extol; and, having determined upon the propriety of the thing, he, without seeming to entertain any doubts as to its practicability, leaves LORD LIVERPOOL nothing to do but “to consider of the *mode* of recommending “the Portuguese to the charitable disposition of his Majesty’s subjects.”—Now, why was not this plan pursued? It certainly would have been preferable to a *parliamentary* grant; because it would have afforded those who love the Portuguese and their cause a fair opportunity of evincing it; while, on the other hand, it would have left no room for grumbling amongst those who may think that Portugal has already cost us a great deal too much, and that, in spite of all appearances, or, rather, reports, to defend a people, except in the character of *auxiliary*, is impossible.—I approve of the LORD MARSHALL’s plan; and, doubtless, those who have always been for the war in Spain and Portugal, would have cheerfully contributed towards the relief of the poor crea-

tures, who have so severely suffered from that war.—Whether the war was, on our part just or unjust, wise or foolish, is not here the question; the question is whether the poor unfortunate wretches who have suffered from it ought to be relieved from this country, and this is a question, which, I think, must be decided in the affirmative, unless, indeed, we could *make France* afford them relief, which is not very probable.—There can be no doubt, that, if it had not been for us, the poor creatures would not have had their country ravaged in the manner that they have. To be sure, what we have done, and are doing, is all *for their good*; but, still, they ought to be compensated for their losses, because, as to individuals, at any rate, there is no satisfactory proof, that they invited us to their country.—It may be said, that it is better for them to suffer loss of goods and chattels and even loss of life, than to let the French have the government of the country in their hands; that, compared to this, hanging or drowning or shooting would be nothing. This is going a good way: farther than our life-and-fortune-men would like to go, I believe. But, let it be so, still we went to Portugal without being actually *sent for* by the people at large, and, therefore I am decidedly for their being compensated for their losses and sufferings by us. But, then, I am for the mode pointed by the Lord Marshall. I am for leaving the honour of relieving the Portuguese *to those who were for the war in Portugal*. To them belongs the merit of making and abetting the war, and I would by no means deprive them of the pleasure of paying the expences of it.—Not a word, however, do we hear of MEETINGS for this purpose! Whither are fled all the choice spirits of good old full-blooded Anti-Jacobin times; No meetings at the Mansion House! No meetings at Lloyds!! No Turtle Patriot meetings; Why, the very Turtle and Turbot and Venison and Wine that were swallowed upon the proclaiming of this war would have fetched half the money now granted to the poor, miserable, naked, starving and lacerated wretches that it has produced. What! *A hundred thousand Pound!* Spirit of Voluntary Contributions, whither art thou fled! Art gone amongst the worms to seek “the great statesman now no more?” What! *A hundred thousand pounds!* Why it is not above a *shilling a head* for the poor creatures. It is not enough to get them *one single quartern*

loaf each. This is liberality and charity indeed.—But I hear of no meetings. There used to be meetings for raising money for shoes and flannel shirts and trousers and drawers, and all manner of things, in order to make our allies comfortable while they were fighting against the French. The very women and children used to subscribe. But, now, alas! all that the poor Portuguese have got, or are likely to get, in the way of voluntary contribution, is about 40 lines of doggerel from the pen of poet Fitzgerald; and, he being a *pensioner*, even that cannot be called *voluntary*. This is a sad falling off to be sure. Why should not those, who met for the purpose of instigating the war, subscribe 20 or 30 thousand pounds each? And those, too, who *Addressed the King* upon his resolution to enter into the war. These are the men to indemnify the poor creatures in Portugal, who, if they had 12 or 18 guineas each given them, might get on again pretty well; but, really, to vote the people of Portugal a *shilling* each is what I could not have expected.—Let us hope, however, that we shall see meetings held yet. Those who *instigated* the war, and who, no doubt, saw clearly the *profits* of it, will, let us hope, not remain deaf to the tender voice of charity, especially when the goddess speaks through the lips of a *Wellesley*. But, it is time for them to begin to meet; for, the next dispatches may tell us, that the Lord Marshall is again at his old work of *drawing Massena* after him; and it would be very convenient for the Portuguese to hear of our charitable movements *before that takes place*.—Before I quit this subject, I cannot help remarking how *unanimous* the Honourable House was as to the vote of a hundred thousand pounds to the Portuguese. Mr. PONSONBY seconded the motion. All was harmony. And, in the other House, the harmony was, if possible, still more striking; and LORD WELLESLEY, when he proposed the measure, talked about that “distinguished warrior,” his brother, in strains that really were quite moving.—The daily newspapers have taken their fill of victory; and, indeed, with some of them the two frequent effects of inordinate repletion seem to have followed. The TIMES, which for some time seems to have been *doing penance*, in the hope of *working out its salvation*, has, upon this occasion, surpassed even the regular traders.—It is, to be sure, shameful, to the last degree, to hear boastings like those of the

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last week. Why, what is it, after all? What have we *gained*? Who have we *beaten*? What place, or what men, or what cannon have we *taken*? When the French were following our army, we said, that our General was not *running away*; but that he was *drawing the French after him*. Why do we not allow that the same may now be the case as to the enemy? What a shame! How foolish is this! What shall we gain by it in the end? Is it not better to speak modestly and truly of such things; and, especially until we know the result of the war. It is by the *result* that the victory is known.—Besides, we always seem to forget the *cost* of this war. We seem to forget, that the French General has maintained his army in the country, and that ours has been maintained by the draining of England. Only consider what shipping we have had attendant upon this our army, carrying it supplies of all sorts, and having transports constantly at hand to bring it off, if necessary. We seem to forget this. And, then, we maintain that *all* the people in Portugal are *enemies of the French*. So that they have all sorts of difficulties to encounter. They are in an *enemy's* country; they have no communication with home; they have no supplies but what they collect upon the spot; no shipping; no external resources; while we have a fleet the seamen of which are half as numerous as their army; and, yet they have been able to keep their ground, to lie in front of us, and to *hem us up* for six months.—But, after all, what was Massena to do, if we did not go *out of our lines*? If our general resolved not to stir out, it was useless for the French to lie where they were. The question of *victory* is to be settled by the *result*; and as to that no man can yet know any thing. If, indeed, Spain and Portugal shall be finally freed of the French, *completely freed*, and made independent, then it may be said, that we have been *victorious*; but, not 'till then. And, in the mean while, I beseech my credulous and easily-amused countrymen to remember how many cannon-firings and illuminations and what huzzaiings, took place for our *victories*, during the *American War*.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Tuesday,
April 16, 1811.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ENGLAND.

REPORT of the Queen's Council, on the State of His Majesty's Health.—Queen's Lodge, Windsor, April 6, 1811.

Present, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, Earl Winchelsea, Earl of Aylesford, Lord Eldon, Lord Ellenborough, Sir W. Grant, (the Duke of Montrose being absent, on account of indisposition.)—We, the Members of the Council, here present, appointed to assist Her Majesty in the execution of the trust committed to her Majesty, by virtue of the Statute passed in the 51st year of His Majesty's reign, entitled, "An Act to provide for the Administration of the Royal Authority, and for the care of His Majesty's Royal Person during the continuance of His Majesty's illness, and for the resumption of the exercise of the Royal Authority by His Majesty;" having called before us and examined on oath the Physicians and other persons attendant on His Majesty, and having ascertained the state of His Majesty's health by such other ways and means as appear to us to be necessary for that purpose, do hereby declare the state of His Majesty's health, at the time of this our meeting, as follows:—That the indisposition with which His Majesty was afflicted at the time of the passing of the said Act does still so far exist, that His Majesty is not yet restored to such a state of health as to be capable of resuming the personal exercise of his Royal Authority.—That His Majesty appears to have made material progress towards recovery since the passing of the Act; and that all His Majesty's Physicians continue to express their expectations of such recovery.—(Signed) C. CANTUAR', J. EBOR', WINCHILSEA, AYLESFORD, ELDON, ELLENBOROUGH, W. GRANT.

ANHOLT.—Letter from J. W. Maurice, commanding a Detachment of Marines at Anholt, to Sir James Saumarez, giving an Account of the Repulse of the Danes from that Island.—March 27, 1811.

(Concluded from p. 928.)

I took the field with Major Torrens (who, though wounded, insisted on accompanying me) and Lieutenant and Adjutant Steele; but as our prisoners were so numerous, and as we had no place of security in which to place them, I could only employ on this occasion the brigade of

howitzers under Lieutenants R. C. Steele and Besant, of the Royal Marine Artillery, and part of the Light Company commanded by Lieutenant Turnbull. When we arrived at the west end of the island, we found that the enemy had formed on the beach, and were protected by fourteen gun-boats towed close to the shore. To attack such a force, with four howitzers and forty men, seemed an useless sacrifice of brave men's lives: I therefore with the advice of Major Torrens halted on the hills, while I reluctantly saw the reserve embarked under cover of the gun-boats, and the flotilla take a final leave of the island.—I am happy to say, our loss has not been so considerable as might have been expected from so desperate an attack, we having only two killed and thirty wounded. The enemy has suffered severely; we have buried between thirty and forty of their dead, and have received in the hospital twenty-three of their wounded, most of them have undergone amputations, three since dead of their wounds, besides a great number which they carried off the field to their boats. Major Melsteat, the commandant, fell in the field; Captain Borgen, the next in command, wounded in the arm; Captain Prutz, Adjutant General to the Commander of the forces in Jutland, lost both his legs; since dead.—The most pleasing part of my duty is to bear testimony to the zeal, energy, and intrepidity of the officers and men I had the honour to command: to particularise would be impossible; the same ardour inspired the whole. To Lieutenant Baker, next in command, who will have the honour of delivering this dispatch, and will give you every information you may require, I am much indebted; his merit and zeal as an officer, which I have some years been acquainted with, and his volunteering with me on this service, claim my warmest esteem. Captain Torrens, the senior officer of the Royal Marines, and who acted as Commandant of the Garrison, bore a conspicuous part on this day, and although wounded, I did not lose his valuable service and able support. The discipline and state of perfection to which he had brought the battalion is highly creditable to him as an officer. Lieutenant R. C. Steele, senior Officer of Royal Marine Artillery, also claims my warmest acknowledgments for the arrangements he made, which enabled us to keep up so heavy and destructive a fire. Captain Steele, Lieutenant and Quarter-

Master Fischer senior Subaltern, Lieutenant and Adjutant Steele, Lieutenants Stewart, Gray, Ford, Jellico, Atkinson, and Curtayne, all merit my warmest acknowledgments for the assistance they afforded me. Lieutenant Bezant, of the R. M. Artillery, deserves every commendation I can give him for his cool and able judgment in the direction of the guns on the Massarcene battery. Lieutenant Turnbull, who acted as Captain of the Light Company, when we pursued the reserve, manifested such zeal and energy, that I have no doubt, had we brought the enemy again to action, he would have borne a very conspicuous part.—I cannot sufficiently express my thanks to Captains Baker and Stewart of the Tartar and Sheldrake, for their great exertions to get round to the Flotilla; and had the wind the least favoured them they would have destroyed the whole.—I am happy to add, that the property belonging to the merchants has been fully protected without meeting with the least loss.—The expedition sailed from the Randers, commanded by Major Melsteat (an officer of great distinction), and consisted of the following corps—2d Battalion of Jutland Sharp Shooters, 4th Battalion 2d Regiment of Jutland Yagers, 1st Regiment of Jutland Infantry, with some others, the names of which cannot be ascertained.—I have the honour to inclose the article of surrender, a return of killed and wounded, and a list of Danish officers killed and taken. Also a return of ordnance stores taken.—I have the honour to be, &c.—J. W. MAURICE, Commandant.

Article of Surrender.

“The Commanding Officer of the troops of his Danish Majesty occupied in the attack of Anholt, agrees to surrender prisoner of war at discretion, with all the troops, to the forces of His Britannic Majesty, with the reserve that their personal property shall be retained by them, and that, at the convenience of the Commander of the Island of Anholt, a cartel with unsealed letters shall be sent to Jutland. Given at Anholt, the 27th of March, 1811.—BORGEN, Captain and Commander in Chief of the Danish troops on Anholt.

DENMARK.—*Danish account of the attack upon Anholt.—Copenhugen, March 31, 1811.*

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make an attack upon the Island of Anholt now in possession of the enemy, in order to conquer the fort and establishments there erected. This intention would have been put in execution in the fall of last year, but as the enemy's ships of war kept on their station until the frost and ice set in, this place was given up, being found to be impracticable.—It was in the commencement of this spring that the attack was again resolved to be made; but the gun boats which were intended to be used in the expedition were at that time in winter quarters in the lakes, which were this year for a long time covered with ice; and which prevented the vessels being put into activity before the beginning of the present month.—The order for attack was given, and on the 23rd instant, the flotilla and transports were assembled in Gierrila Bay. The island was reconnoitred, and it was found that there was only one schooner lying on the station. We knew that the Light-house was fortified, but no other part of the island. It was in consequence determined, that the troops should be disembarked by night, and on the morning march against the Light-house Fort, and storm it, while in the mean time the gun-boats were to fire upon it from the rear, a formal siege being found to be impracticable. On the 26th twelve gun-boats and twelve transport vessels sailed from Gierrila Bay, having on board the troops destined for the expedition. On the 27th, at 4 in the morning, the troops were disembarked in the greatest order. The first Lieut. Carl Holsten, in the naval service, marched immediately with 200 seamen, along the shore, but unfortunately he was discovered by a patrol of cavalry. The enemy now fled into the fort, and it was not in our power to cut him off. The intrepid naval Lieut. Holsten followed them, and stormed the fort, but was beaten off. Major Melstedt then put himself at the head of the 650 men under his command, and being joined by 150 men under Capt. V. Reydz, and the seamen under Lieut. Holsten, undertook a general storm, but were again forced to retire. In the meanwhile the flotilla were laid round the fort, and commenced a firing on it, whilst the troops were preparing for a fresh attack. The loss which had been sustained by these warriors only tended to increase their ardour. Whilst the gun-boats kept up a brisk fire on the flank of the fort, Major Melstedt on the one side, and

Lieutenant Holsten on the other, commenced the attack. The out-works were already gained, and the troops were preparing to get over the high walls, when cartridge shot poured down on them from more than forty pieces of cannon. Major Von Melstedt ended his honourable career at the head of his troops. Captain V. Reydz then immediately took the command, and inspired new life into the brave troops, who with the greatest steadiness, stood the dreadful fire, and in conjunction with the valiant Lieutenant Holsten, again renewed the attack. A cannon ball carried away both of Captain V. Reydz's legs, and another put an end to the life of Lieutenant Holsten, whilst leading his brave seamen on to combat. The men who had still to pass the inner and very deep ditch, were obliged to give way for the cartridge balls, but their retreat was nevertheless conducted with the utmost order. An English battery pursued the fugitives, and the retreat was performed under a continual fire from the enemy. In the meantime, and very unexpectedly, a frigate was seen to the northward, which stood round to the east of the island, a brig steered to the west part, a schooner came from the southward. It came to blow hard, and the gun boats could no longer keep their station. Endeavours were then made to reembark as many as possible of the troops, and to save such as had escaped from the enemy. The transport vessels had something the appearance of gun-boats, and they were therefore caused to steer towards the Trefoerd, in order thereby to decoy the frigate to follow them, and thereby save the gun-boats, and the troops embarked on board of them; but the wind increased, and the gale became so violent, that the gun-boats could scarcely be kept afloat. To enter into an engagement with the enemy was not to be thought of, and it would have been a useless loss of time to have endeavoured, at this time to collect the boats together.—It was therefore deemed most expedient to let the flotilla disperse itself. Signal was accordingly made for boats to reach the nearest shore, and the flotilla accordingly dispersed itself agreeably to orders given. The movement could not be perceived by the frigate, which was lying to the eastward of the island, on account of the reef which run out from it.—Eight of the gun-boats that were nearest together, made the best of their way for Jutland, whilst the other

four, with the utmost bravery, engaged the brig and schooner; they detained the enemy in his progress, and brought him several points out of his course; one of these boats is safe, the fate of the other three is still uncertain, possibly they may be fallen into the enemy's hands. Although that this expedition has been unsuccessful, yet the enemy will certainly not have to boast of having obtained an easy victory; even during the retreat, the schooner sustained so much damage, that she was obliged to put in under the island, and to seek to obtain assistance. Besides the three commanders, several other of our Officers fell in the field of honour.—During the whole of the affair, the most determined courage was shewn on our part, and the very considerable loss sustained in killed and wounded in proportion to the corps employed, will sufficiently prove the determined resolution and courage with which these brave men continued the combat under such a heavy fire; and have again, on this occasion, proved the ancient valour which is inseparable from the character of the people of Denmark and Norway, who are always ready to shed their blood for their King and native country.

PORTUGAL.—*Copy of a Dispatch from Viscount Wellington, to the Earl of Liverpool; dated Pero Negro, 27th October, 1810.—Laid before Parliament, April, 1811.*

My Lord.—Your Lordship has been apprized of the measures which had been adopted, to induce the inhabitants of Portugal to quit that part of the country, through which the enemy was likely to pass, or which it was probable would become the seat of his operations; carrying off with them their valuable property, and every thing which could tend to the enemy's subsistence, or to facilitate his progress.—There is no doubt that these inhabitants had sufficient knowledge, from former experience, of the treatment they would receive from the enemy: and there is no instance of those of any town or village having remained, or of their having failed to remove what might be useful to the enemy, when they had sufficiently early intimation of the wishes of government or of myself, that they should abandon their houses, and carry away their property.—All those who are acquainted with the nature of military operations,

with their dependance upon the assistance of the country to supply the wants of the army, and particularly with the degree to which the French armies depend upon this assistance, must be aware of the distress which this system has occasioned to the enemy; and the official and private letters which have been intercepted, are filled with complaints of its effects; which have been repeated in the official papers published in the *Moniteur* at Paris.—It happened, unfortunately, that the Indian-corn harvest, which is the principal support of the inhabitants of a large part of Portugal, was on the ground at the moment of the enemy's invasion. This of course could not be carried off; and where the enemy's troops have been, they here, as usual, destroyed what they could not consume; and nothing remains.—If, therefore, the result of the campaign should be to oblige the enemy to withdraw from Portugal, it is much to be apprehended that the greatest distress will be felt in those districts through which the enemy's troops have passed; which there are no means whatever in this country of relieving.—Upon former occasions, the wealthy inhabitants of Great Britain, and of London in particular, have stepped forward to assist and relieve the distresses of foreign nations, whether suffering under the calamities inflicted by Providence, or by a cruel and powerful enemy. This nation has received the benefit of the charitable disposition of his Majesty's subjects; and there never was a case, in which their assistance was required in a greater degree, whether the sufferings of the people, or their fidelity to the cause they have espoused, and their attachment to his Majesty's subjects, be considered.—I declare, that I have scarcely known an instance in which any person in Portugal, even of the lowest order, has had communication with the enemy, inconsistent with his duty to his own Sovereign, or with the orders he had received.—I would, therefore, beg leave to recommend the unfortunate portion of the inhabitants, who have suffered from the enemy's invasion, to your Lordship's protection; and I request you to consider of the mode of recommending them to the benevolent disposition of his Majesty's subjects, at the moment, which I hope may be not far distant, that the enemy may be under the necessity of evacuating the country.—I have, &c.—(Signed) WELLINGTON.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—*Extract of Dispatches from Lord Viscount Talavera, Oliveira de l' Hospital, March 21. 1811.*

The enemy suffered much more in the affair of the 15th than I was aware of, when I addressed you on the 16th inst; the firing was not over till dark, and it appears that great numbers were drowned in attempting to ford the Ceira.—The enemy withdrew his rear-guard from that river in the course of the 16th, and we crossed it on the 17th and had our posts on the Sierra de Murcella; the enemy's army being in a strong position on the right of the Alva. They moved a part of their army on that night, but still maintained their position on the Alva, of which river they destroyed the bridges. We turned their left by the Sierra de Santa Quiteria with the 3d, 1st, and 5th divisions on the 18th, while the light division and the 6th manœuvred in their front from the Sierra de Murcella; these movements induced the enemy to bring back to the Sierra de Moita the troops which had marched the preceding night, at the same time that they received their corps from the Alva, and in the evening their whole army were assembled upon Moita, and the advanced posts of our right were near Arganil, those of our left across the Alva.—The enemy retired from the position of Moita in the night of the 18th, and have continued their retreat with the utmost rapidity ever since; and I imagine their rear-guard will be at Celorico this day. We assembled the army upon the Sierra de Moita on the 19th, and our advanced posts are this day beyond Pinhancos. The Militia under Colonels Wilson and Trant, are at Fornos.—We have taken great numbers of prisoners, and the enemy have continued to destroy their carriages and their cannon, and whatever would impede their progress.—As the great number of the prisoners taken on the 19th had been sent out on foraging parties towards the Mondego, and had been ordered to return to their position on the Alva, I conclude that the enemy had intended to remain in it for some days.—Soult has gone to Seville since the fall of Badajos; and it is reported, that about three thousand French troops had been seen on their march through Barcarota to the Southward.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—*A dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was yesterday evening received from Lieute-*

tenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., by the Earl of Liverpool, dated Goveia, March 27.—London, 13th April 1811.

When I found that the enemy retired with such celerity from Moita, I continued the pursuit of them with the cavalry, and the light division under Major-General Sir William Erskine only, supporting these troops with the 6th and 3rd divisions of infantry, and by the militia on the right of the Mondego; and I was induced to halt the remainder of the army till the supplies, which had been sent round from the Tagus to the Mondego, should arrive. This halt was the more desirable, as nothing could be found in the country; and every day's march increasing the distance from the magazines on the Tagus rendered the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious; and the further advance of the main body for a few days did not appear to be necessary. The cavalry and light troops continued to annoy the enemy's rear and to take prisoners; and the militia under Colonel Wilson had an affair with a detachment of the enemy, on the 22nd, not far from Celorico, in which they killed seven and wounded several, and took fifteen prisoners. The militia under General Silveira also took some prisoners on the 25th.—The enemy retired his left, the 2nd corps, by Goveia through the mountains upon Guarda, and the remainder of the army by the high road upon Celorico. They have since moved more troops upon Guarda, which position they still hold in strength. Our advanced guard is in front of Celorico, towards Guarda, and at Alverca, and the 3rd division in the mountains, and occupying Porco Miserella and Prados.—The allied troops will be collected in the neighbourhood of Celorico to-morrow.—General Ballasteros surprised General Remon on the 10th, at Palma, and dispersed his detachment, and took from him five hundred prisoners.—General Ballasteros had since retired to Valverde, and I hear that General Zayas had been detached from Cadiz with six thousand men, including four hundred cavalry, to be disembarked at Huelva to join General Ballasteros.—P. S. Since writing the above, I have received the report of a gallant action of one of our patrols yesterday evening, between Alverca and Guarda, under the command of Lieutenant Perse of the 16th Light Dragoons, and Lieutenant Foster of the Royals, who at-

tacked a detachment of the enemy's cavalry between Alverca and Guarda, and killed and wounded several of them, and took the Officer and 37 men prisoners.—The enemy have withdrawn from Pinhel across the Coa.

Foreign Office, April 12.

Dispatches have this day been received at this office from Charles Stuart, Esq. his Majesty's Minister at Lisbon, dated the 30th ult. stating that Sir William Beresford, having united the whole of his force in Portalegre on the 23rd of March, advanced on the 24th, and attacked the enemy with his cavalry on the 25th. They were compelled to abandon Campo Maior, with the loss of 600 men killed and wounded. On the 26th General Beresford's head-quarters were at Elvas.—The enemy had withdrawn their whole force, excepting a weak picquet, to the other side of the Guadiana.—The corps under Marshal Soult has halted in the neighbourhood of Llerena.—General Ballesteros had returned to Gibrleon, on the 29th, where his force had been increased by the arrival of 6000 men under General Zayas.—Marshal Bessieres arrived at Zamora on the 5th of March, with 7000 men.

FRANCE.—*Decree relative to the making of Sugar and Indigo out of Beet Root and Plant-woad.*—25th March, 1811.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, &c. —Upon the report of the commission appointed to examine the means proper to naturalise on the continent of our empire, sugar, indigo, cotton, and divers other productions of the two Indies:—Upon the presentation made to us, of a considerable quantity of beet-root sugar, refined, crystallized, and possessing all the qualities and properties of cane sugar:—Upon the presentation also made to us at the Council of Commerce, of a great quantity of indigo extracted from the plantwoad, which our departments of the south produce in abundance, and which indigo has all the properties of the indigo of the two Indies:—Having reason to expect that, by means of these two precious discoveries, our empire will shortly be relieved from an exportation of 100,000,000, hitherto necessary for supplying the consumption of sugar and indigo:—We have decreed, and decree as follows:—Art. 1. Plantations of beet-root, proper for the fabrication of sugar, shall be formed in our empire to

the extent of 32,000 hectares*. 2. Our Minister of the Interior shall distribute the 32,000 hectares among the departments of our empire, taking into consideration those departments where the culture of tobacco may be established, and those which, from the nature of the soil, may be more favourable to the culture of the beet-root. 3. Our Prefects shall take measures that the number of hectares allotted to their respective departments shall be in full cultivation this year, or next year at the latest.—4. A certain number of hectares shall be laid out in our Empire, in plantations of woad proper for the fabrication of indigo, and in proportion to the quantity necessary for our manufactures.—5. Our Minister of the Interior shall distribute the said number among the departments of the Empire, taking into particular consideration the departments beyond the Alps, and those of the South, where this branch of cultivation formerly made great progress.—6. Our Prefects shall take measures, that the quantity of hectares, allotted to their departments, shall be in full cultivation next year, at the latest.—7. The Commission shall, before the 4th of May, fix upon the places most convenient for the establishment of six experimental schools, for giving instruction in the manufacture of beet-root sugar, conformably to the process of the chymists.—8. The Commission shall, also, by the same period, fix upon the places most convenient for the establishment of four experimental schools, for giving instruction as to the extraction of indigo from the lees of the woad, according to the processes approved by the Commission.—9. Our Minister of the Interior shall make known to the Prefects in what places these schools shall be formed, and to which the pupils destined for this manufacture should be sent. The proprietors and farmers who may wish to attend the course of lectures in the said experimental schools shall be admitted thereto.—10. Messrs. Barruel and Isnard, who have brought to perfection the processes for extracting sugar from beet-root, shall be specially charged with the direction of two of the six experimental schools.—11. Our Minister of the Interior shall in consequence, cause to be paid to them

* The hectare is 2.472 English Statute Acres, or 2 A. 1 R. 35½ P. — therefore, 32,000 hectares are equal to nearly 80,000 English Acres.

the sum necessary for the formation of the said establishments, which sum shall be charged upon the fund of one million, placed, in the budget of the year 1811, at the disposal of the said minister, for the encouragement of the manufacture of beet-root sugar, and woad indigo.—12. From the 1st of Jan. 1813, and upon the report to be made by our Minister of the Interior, the sugar and indigo of the two Indies shall be prohibited, and be considered as merchandize of English manufacture, or proceeding from English commerce.—13. Our Minister of the Interior is charged with the execution of the present decree.

NAPOLÉON.

AMERICAN STATES.—*Mr. Pinckney to Lord Wellesley.—Great Cumberland Place, Dec. 10, 1810.*

MY LORD,

In compliance with the request contained in your note of the 6th instant, I proceed to recapitulate in this letter (with some variations, however), the statements and remarks which I had the honour to make in our conference of the 5th, respecting the revocation of the French Decrees, as connected with a change of system here on the subject of neutral rights.—Your Lordship need not be told, that I should have been happy to offer at a much earlier moment every explanation in my power on matters of such high concern to the rights and commerce of my country, and the future character of its foreign relations, if I had been made to understand that explanation was desired.—My written communications of August and November were concise, but they were not intended to be insufficient. They furnished evidence which I thought conclusive, and abstained from laboured commentary, because I deemed it superfluous. I had taken up an opinion, which I abandoned reluctantly and late, that the British Government would be eager to follow the example of France, in recalling, as it had professed to do in promulgating, that extraordinary system of maritime annoyance, which in 1807 presented to neutral trade in almost all its directions the hopeless alternative of inactivity or confiscation; which considered it as a subject to be regulated, like the trade of the United Kingdoms, by the statutes of the British Parliament, and undertook to bend and fashion it by every variety of expedient to all the purposes and even the caprices of Great

Britain. I had no idea that the remnant of that system, productive of no conceivable advantage to England, and deservedly odious for its theory and destructive effects to others, could survive the public declaration of France that the edicts of Berlin and Milan were revoked. Instructed at length, however, by your Lordship's continued silence, and alarmed for the property of my fellow-citizens, now more than ever exposed by an erroneous confidence to the ruinous operation of the British Orders, I was preparing to support my general representations by detailed remonstrance, when I received the honour of your note of the 4th instant. In the conference which ensued, I troubled your Lordship with a verbal communication, of which the following is nearly the substance.—The doubts which appear to stand in the way of the recal of the British Orders in Council (under which denomination I include certain orders of blockade of a kindred principle and spirit) must refer to the manner, or the terms, or the practical effect of the alleged repeal of the decrees of France.—That the manner of the proceeding is satisfactory to the British Government cannot be questioned; since it is precisely that in which its own numerous orders for establishing, modifying, or removing blockades and other maritime obstructions, are usually proclaimed to neutral states and merchants.—The French repeal was officially notified on the 5th of August to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris by the French Minister of foreign affairs, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship in my letter of the 25th of the same month, which not only gave the import, but (as the enclosed copy will shew) adopted the words of General Armstrong's statement to me of the tenour and effect of that notice.—On the 9th of August the notification of Gen. Armstrong was published in the *Moniteur*, the official journal of the French Government, as the act of that Government; and thus became a formal declaration and a public pledge to all who had an interest in the matter of it.—It would be a waste of time to particularize the numerous instances of analogous practices in England, by which this course is countenanced; but a recent example happens to be before me, and may therefore be mentioned. The partial recal, or modification, of the English blockade of the ports and places of Spain from Gijon to the French territory (itself known to my

Government only through a circular notification to me, recited afterwards in the London Gazette) was declared to the American and other Governments in exactly the same mode.—I think it demonstrable that the terms in which the French revocation was announced are just as free from well founded objection as the manner.—Your Lordship's view of them is entirely unknown to me; but I am not ignorant that there are those in this country, who, professing to have examined them with care, and having certainly examined them with jealousy, maintain that the revocation on the 1st of November was made to depend, by the obvious meaning to those terms, upon a condition precedent, which has not been fulfilled, namely, the revocation by Great Britain of her Orders in Council, including such blockading orders as France complains of as illegal.—If this were even admitted to be so, I am yet to learn upon what ground of justice the British Government could decline to meet, by a similar act on its part, an advance, thus made to it by its adversary in the face of the world, towards a co-operation in the great work of restoring the liberty of the ocean; so far at least as respects the Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809, and such blockades as resemble them. It is not necessary, however, to take this view of the question; for the French revocation turns on no condition precedent, is absolute, precise, and unequivocal.—What construction of the document which declares that revocation might be made by determined suspicion and distrust, I have no wish and am not bound to enquire. Such interpreters would not be satisfied by any form of words, and would be likely to draw the same conclusion from perfect explicitness and studied obscurity. It is enough for me that the fair and natural and necessary import of the paper affords no colour for the interpretation I am about to examine.—The French declaration, "that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that from the 1st of November they will cease to have any effect," is precision itself: but they are followed by these words—"bien entendu qu'en consequence de cette declaration les Anglois revoqueront leurs arrêts de Conseil, et renonceront aux nouveaux principes de blocus qu'ils ont voulu établir, ou bien que les Etats Unis, conformément à l'acte que vous venez de communiquer, feront respecter leurs Droits par les Anglois."—If these words state any condition, they

state two, the first depending upon Great Britain, the last upon the United States; and, as they are put in the disjunctive, it would be extravagant to hold that the non-performance of one of them is equivalent to the non-performance of both. I shall take for granted, therefore, that the arguments against my construction of the Duke of Cadore's letter must be moulded into a new form. It must deal with two conditions, instead of one: and, considering them equally as conditions precedent, to be performed (disjunctively) before the day limited for the operative commencement of the French repeal, must maintain, that, if neither of them should be performed before that day, the decrees were not to be revoked, and consequently that, as neither of them has been so performed, the decrees are still in force.—If this hypothesis of previous conditions, thus reduced to the only shape it can assume, be proved to be unsound, my construction is at once established; since it is only upon that hypothesis that any doubt can be raised against the exact and perspicuous assurances that the decrees were actually repealed, and that the repeal would become effectual on the 1st of November. This hypothesis is proved to be unsound by the following considerations.—It has clearly no foundation in the phraseology of the paper, which does not contain a syllable to put any condition before the repeal. The repeal is represented as a step already taken, to have effect on a day specified. Certain consequences are, indeed, declared to be expected from this proceeding; but no day is given, either expressly or by implication, within which they are to happen. It is not said "*bien entendu que les Anglois auront revoqué,*" &c. but "*que les Anglois revoqueront,*" &c. indefinitely as to time.—The notion of conditions precedent is, therefore, to say the least of it, perfectly gratuitous; but it is also absurd. It drives us to the conclusion, that a palpable and notorious impossibility was intended to be prescribed as a condition, in a paper which they, who think it was meant to deceive, must admit was meant to be plausible.—It was a palpable and notorious impossibility that the United States should, before the 1st of November, execute any condition, no matter what the nature of it, the performance of which was to follow the ascertained failure of a condition, to be executed by Great Britain, at any time before the same 1st of November. That the act

expected from the United States was to be consequent upon the failure of the other is apparent. It is also apparent that upon any interpretation, which would make the act of Great Britain a condition precedent to the French repeal, consequently precedent to the 1st of November (when the repeal was, if ever, to take effect), that condition could not be said to have failed before the whole period, from the 5th of August to the 1st of November, had elapsed. But if Great Britain had the whole time within which to elect the course which she would pursue, what opportunity would be left to the United States (equally bound, upon this idea of conditions precedent, to act their part within the same period) to become acquainted with that election, and to decide upon and take their own course in consequence; to say nothing of the transmission of such intelligence of it to Europe as would be indispensable to the efficacy of the conditional revocation?—This general view would alone be sufficient to discredit the arbitrary construction under consideration: but it will be more completely exposed by an explanation of the nature of the act, which the letter professes to expect from the United States, in case Great Britain should omit to revoke. This Act is the revival of the Non-Inter-course Law against England; France remaining exempt from it, as well as from the provisions of the subsequent law, commonly called the Non-Inter-course Act. Now, it is too plain upon the face of the last mentioned law (to which the letter expressly refers) to escape the most negligent and unskilful observer, that this revival could not by any industry or chance be accomplished before the time fixed for the cessation of the French decrees, or even for a considerable time afterwards; it certainly cannot be allowable to assume, that the revival was required by the letter (whatever was the object of the writer or his Government) to precede the cessation. And if this was not required, it is incontrovertible that the cessation would by the term of the letter, take place on the appointed day, whether any of the events disjunctively specified had intervened or not.—The first step towards the revival of the non-intercourse against England would be the proclamation of the President, that France had so revoked or modified her edicts, that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States. But the letter of Mons. Champagny left

the decrees as it found them up to the 1st of November; and, consequently, up to that day it could not, for any thing contained in that letter, be said that the rights of American commerce were no longer infringed by them. A prospective proclamation, that they would cease to violate those rights, might perhaps be issued; but it could scarcely have any substantial operation, either in favour of France, or to the prejudice of England, until the epoch to which it had looked had arrived.—Let it be admitted, however, that all physical and legal obstacles to the issuing, before the first of November, of a proclamation, to take effect immediately, were out of the way. How would such a proceeding fulfil of itself the expectation that the United States would, before the 1st of November, "cause their rights to be respected by the English," in the mode pointed out by the letter, namely, by the enforcement of the Non-intercourse Law? The proclamation would work no direct or immediate consequence against England. Three months from its date must pass away before the Non-intercourse Law could revive against her; and when it did so, the revival would not be the effect of the proclamation, but of the continued adherence of England to her obnoxious system. Thus, even if a proclamation, effectual from its date, had been issued by the President on the day when the French declaration of repeal came to the hands of the American Minister at Paris, the intercourse between the United States and Great Britain would, on the 1st of November, have remained in the same condition in which it was found in August. As all this was well understood by the Government of France, the conclusion is, that its Minister, professing too to have the American law before him, and to expect only what was conformable with that law, did not intend to require the revival of the Non-intercourse against England as a condition to be performed before the first of November.—It is worthy of remark, as introductory to another view of this subject, that even they who conclude that the repeal of the French decrees has failed, are not backward to ascribe to the French declaration a purpose utterly inconsistent with that conclusion. They suppose the purpose to have been to affect the existing relations between America and England, by the only means which the declaration states—the act of Non-intercourse. And it is cer-

tain, that unless England should abandon particular parts of her system, this was the result avowedly in view, and meant to be accomplished.—But there could be no hope of such a result without a previous effectual relinquishment of the French decrees. A case could not otherwise be made to exist (as the Duke of Cadore was aware) for such an operation of the American law. To pass the law before the revocation of the edicts were impossible. With the law in his hands, it would have been miraculous ignorance not to know that it was the exact reverse of this which his paper must propose. He would derive this knowledge not from that particular law only but from the whole tenour and spirit of American proceedings, in that painful and anomalous dilemma, in which Great Britain and France, agreeing in nothing else, had recently combined to place the maritime interests of America. He would collect from these proceedings, that, while those conflicting Powers continued to rival each other in their aggression on neutral rights, the government of the United States would oppose itself impartially to both. The French declaration, then, had either no meaning at all, or it meant to announce to General Armstrong a positive revocation of the French edicts.—I should only fatigue your Lordship by pursuing farther a point so plain and simple. I shall, therefore, merely add to what I have already said on this branch of the subject, that the strong and unqualified communication from General Armstrong to me, mentioned in the commencement of this letter, and corroborated by subsequent communications, (one of which I now lay before you) may, perhaps, without any great effort of courtesy, be allowed to contain "that authentic intelligence" which your lordship is in search of. He could scarcely have been free from doubt, if the occasion was calculated to suggest it, and, if he had actually doubted, would hardly have spoken to me with the confidence of conviction.—It only remains to speak of the practical effect of the French repeal. And here your lordship must suffer me to remind you, that the orders of England of 1807 did not wait for the practical effect of the Berlin decree, nor linger till the obscurity in which the meaning of that decree was supposed to be involved,

should be cleared away by time or explanation. They came promptly after the decree itself, while it was not only ambiguous but inoperative, and raised upon an idle prohibition, and a yet more idle declaration, which France had not attempted to enforce, and was notoriously incapable of enforcing, a vast scheme of oppression upon the seas, more destructive of all the acknowledged rights of peaceful states than history can parallel. This retaliation, as it was called, was so rapid, that it was felt before the injury which was said to have provoked it; and yet that injury, such as it was, was preceded by the practical assertion on the part of Great Britain, of new and alarming principles of public law, in the notification of the blockade of May, 1806, and in the judicial decisions of the year before. To uphold the retaliatory orders, every thing was presumed with a surprising facility. Not only was an impotent, unexecuted, and equivocal menace presumed to be an active scourge of the commerce of neutral nations, but the acquiescence of those nations was presumed against the plainest evidence of facts. The alacrity with which all this was done can never be remembered without regret and astonishment; but our regret and astonishment must increase, if after some years have been given to the pernicious innovation which these presumptions were to introduce and support, something like the same alacrity should not be displayed on seizing an honourable opportunity of discharging it for ever.—It is not unnatural to imagine that it will be discharged with pleasure when it is considered, that, having never been effectual as an instrument of hostility, it cannot now lay claim to those other recommendations for which it may have heretofore been prized. The Orders in Council [of November] have passed, through some important changes; but they have been steady, as long as it was possible, to the purpose which first impressed upon them a character not to be mistaken.—In their original plan they comprehended not only France and such allied or dependent Powers as had adopted the edict of Berlin, but such other nations as had merely excluded from their ports the commercial flag of England.

(To be continued.)